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Too resilient for anyone’s good
“Infant psychophysics” viewed through
second-order cybernetics, Part 1
(background and problems)
Lance Nizami
Independent Researcher, Palo Alto, California, USA
Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to examine the observer’s role in “infant psychophysics”. Infant psychophysics
was developed because the diagnosis of perceptual deficits should be done as early in a patient’s life as
possible, to provide efficacious treatment and thereby reduce potential long-term costs. Infants, however,
cannot report their perceptions. Hence, the intensity of a stimulus at which the infant can detect it, the
“threshold”, must be inferred from the infant’s behavior, as judged by observers (watchers). But whose
abilities are actually being inferred? The answer affects all behavior-based conclusions about infants’
perceptions, including the well-proselytized notion that auditory stimulus-detection thresholds improve
rapidly during infancy.
Design/methodology/approach – In total, 55 years of infant psychophysics is scrutinized, starting with
seminal studies in infant vision, followed by the studies that they inspired in infant hearing.
Findings – The inferred stimulus-detection thresholds are those of the infant-plus-watcher and, more
broadly, the entire laboratory. The thresholds are therefore tenuous, because infants’ actions may differ with
stimulus intensity; expressiveness may differ between infants; different watchers may judge infants
differently; etc. Particularly, the watcher’s ability to “read” the infant may improve with the infant’s age,
confounding any interpretation of perceptual maturation. Further, the infant’s gaze duration, an assumed cue
to stimulus detection, may lengthen or shorten nonlinearly with infant age.
Research limitations/implications – Infant psychophysics investigators have neglected the role of the
observer, resulting in an accumulation of data that requires substantial re-interpretation. Altogether, infant
psychophysics has proven far too resilient for its own good.
Originality/value – Infant psychophysics is examined for the first time through second-order cybernetics.
The approach reveals serious unresolved issues.
Keywords Second-order cybernetics, Perception, Threshold, Observer, Infant, Psychophysics
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
“Resilience” may be loosely defined as adaptability to change or adversity. Resilience allows
ideas and entities to evolve. However, as Elmqvist et al. (2017, p. 352) note, “Resilience may
not always be desirable – witness dictatorships that are resilient across generations.” In
other words, political evolution can benefit some but not others. As in politics, so too in
science, which the taxpayers support. A research paradigm may prove to be too resilient;
that is, a particular idea and its associated methods may persist beyond the limits of
usefulness. For example, a mainstay of cybernetics, namely, Information Theory has been
Particular details were briefly expressed elsewhere (Nizami, 2016). Dr Claire S. Barnes, PhD, provided
valuable assistance. The author also thanks the two anonymous reviewers and Dr Philip Baron and
other editors for their gracious assistance.
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used unjustifiably for more than a half century in perceptual psychology and in
neuroscience (Nizami 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015; Susswein, 2013; after
Shannon, 1956, Wiener, 1956, and Johnson, 1970).
The present work exposes a case of excessive resilience, called “infant psychophysics.”
Infant psychophysics has cost millions of dollars and occupied thousands of man-hours
world-wide over the past 55 years. It is critically reviewed here, and under constant
mindfulness of a second-order cybernetics concern, the role of the observer. Serious problems
emerge.
Scrutiny of infant psychophysics is certainly timely. In theMarch 2016 issue ofAmerican
Scientist, the journal of the 290,000 members of Sigma Xi (The Scientific Research Society),
experimental psychologist R.D. Hamer celebrates the resilience of an infant-psychophysics
method called forced-choice preferential looking (explained below). It was proselytized by
Professor Davida Teller, a former co-author of Hamer (Hamer et al., 1982; Schneck et al.,
1984). The method was intended to assess infants’ perceptual abilities. Now, infants are
notoriously difficult subjects for psychology experiments, such as stimulus-detection or
stimulus-discrimination. Those tasks require that a decision be made about a stimulus, such
as “it is barely visible” or “it is louder than another sound.” For adults, such a decision
rapidly follows an instant of introspection, the decision being reported verbally or (for
example) by pushing a button. Such self-report, however, is impossible for infants. Hence,
some behaviors displayed by infants are quantified, to infer infants’ capabilities. The
relevant methods are reviewed here, followed by criticisms from a second-order-cybernetics
perspective. Further methods, criticisms and conclusions follow in a second paper (Nizami,
2018).
A version of Teller’s method, but tailored to test infants’ hearing, was introduced by
Olsho et al. (1987). Hundreds of similar papers subsequently accumulated. The study of
infant perception is now a world-wide, multi-laboratory, multi-million-dollar endeavor. It
continues to broaden in scope. By 2012, enough infant-hearing studies had been published to
justify a book, Human Auditory Development (see Werner, 2012). A salient finding of that
book is a rapid decrease of auditory detection thresholds during infancy, i.e. infants’ hearing
improves with time. Further, a two-page spotlight on the Werner laboratory (Lau and Ng,
2017) and a longer feature on cochlear auditory implants (Svirsky, 2017) appeared in recent
issues of Physics Today, the magazine of the American Institute of Physics (“approximately
120,000” members; https://www.aip.org). Indeed, implants are a recommended treatment for
infants deemed to be profoundly hearing-impaired (Svirsky, 2017).
The study of infants’ detection/discrimination ability in vision and in hearing is ongoing.
Therefore, it is discussed here using the present tense. Additionally, quotations are used, to
convey the original flavor of the literature, as well as to avoid any appearance of
misrepresentation. Units-wise, this paper uses dB SPL, which means “decibels sound-
pressure-level” (Hartmann, 1998), the standard for research measurement of objective
auditory waveform pressure.
2. “Preferential looking”: the beginning of modern infant psychophysics
2.1 Fantz and colleagues test infants’ visual acuity
Modern infant psychophysics started not with the hearing system but with the visual
system. From the late 1950s through the 1960s, Fantz and colleagues tested the visual acuity
of infants. Let Fantz et al. (1962, p. 907) themselves explain (italics supplied):
If we present a graded series of patterns and find the smallest which elicits a differential ocular
response, we know that visual detail at least that fine can be resolved.
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Note well the profound assumption that a “differential response”, whatever that is judged to
be, indicates differential perception. This assumption underlies all subsequent work on
infant psychophysics. Nonetheless, it remains unsubstantiated. Indeed, a “differential
response” may indicate any number of things, including mere distraction. This possibility is
addressed at length in the companion paper (Nizami, 2018).
The method used by Fantz and colleagues remained the same throughout their work.
Indeed, some particular details set the stage for all further infant psychophysics:
The procedure was to place an infant in a crib inside a test chamber and to expose above him a
striped pattern and a plain gray comparison object for 20 sec (Fantz et al., 1962, p. 908).
In particular:
The lower half of the front side of the chamber was open so that a small hammock-type crib could
be rolled underneath until the infant's head was directly under an observation hole in the center of
the ceiling (Fantz et al., p. 908).
Further, “The stimulus objects were attached to the ceiling to the right and left of this ¼-in.
peephole [i.e. the observation hole]” (Fantz et al., p. 908). Those stimulus objects were
“squares with vertical black and white stripes of equal width . . . each presented with [i.e.
opposite from] the same gray [comparison] square, matched in luminous reflectance” (Fantz
et al., p. 908). Additionally:
“The inside of the chamber was a nonglossy, dark saturated blue color which tended to quiet the
infants and gave a contrasting background for the lighter achromatic objects”, i.e. for the grey
and striped “stimulus objects” (Fantz et al., p. 908).
The experimenters observed the infant through the chamber’s ceiling peephole, noting that:
Tiny reflections of the stimulus objects were clearly visible on the [infant’s] cornea [. . .] The
location of one of these reflections over the pupil provided a simple criterion of fixation (Fantz
et al., p. 908).
That is, “If the left reflection was over the pupil, for example, the infant was looking at the
object on the left” (Fantz et al., p. 908).
The observer determined how long and how often each of the two alternatives (the striped
pattern and the plain gray comparison) was fixated during each single 20-s presentation
interval. The infant (and the observer) had no obligation to choose only one stimulus instead
of the other. Rather, Fantz et al. assumed that an infant could discriminate the striped
“object” from the plain gray comparison square if the infant fixated the former for longer
than the latter, in at least 75 per cent of the 20-s viewing sessions for the particular stimuli.
The thickness of the respective stripes was then the “threshold” thickness, with yet-thicker
stripes being presumably progressively easier to discriminate from gray. The infants were
1-22 weeks old. Later, Fantz (1963) tested subjects from 10 hours old to 5 days old,
apparently using the same set-up.
In Fantz (1963, 1965), only the first fixation time for the striped object was recorded; its
discrimination from the gray object was still determined by whichever was fixated for a
longer time.
2.2 Fantz’s conclusions, including an underemphasized data-phenomenon that recurs
Over the years, Fantz concluded that infants can discriminate from birth between stripes
and unpatterned surfaces, and that over the course of the first six months of age, infants can
discriminate narrower and narrower stripes. However, Fantz also illustrates a result which
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appears (and gains importance) on later studies of infant visual and auditory detection/
discrimination thresholds. That is, Fantz et al. (1962, pp. 910, 915) plot the number of trials
(i.e. choices) on which the infant fixates the stripes for longer than the plain gray stimulus, as
a percentage of the total number of trials with those particular stripes, yielding a set of data
points, one for each width of stripes. Wider stripes empirically correspond to higher
percentages. The data-plots tend to be crudely S-shaped, and that data-plot or any smooth
curve fitted to it is called a psychometric function (Green and Swets, 1966/1988; Macmillan
and Creelman, 1991). The midpoint of the psychometric function is traditionally taken as
indicating the detection/discrimination “threshold” (Green and Swets, 1966/1988; Macmillan
and Creelman, 1991). The psychometric function ideally has an upper asymptote which
approaches 100 per cent and a lower asymptote which approaches the average chance
performance, which is 50 per cent in two-interval forced-choice tasks (Green and Swets,
1966/1988; Macmillan and Creelman, 1991), although scores as low as zero are theoretically
possible.
Fantz et al.’s psychometric functions are interesting, because their slopes prove
remarkably shallow relative to what might be expected from adults performing similar
discriminations. Figure 1 shows a schematized example of this difference for a Fantz-type
experiment. Shallow slopes for infants suggest that a distinct “threshold” is illusory. This is
important, because shallow slopes appear in later vision and hearing stimulus-detection
studies with infants (Nizami, 2018).
Figure 1.
Examples of
psychometric
functions for adults
and for infants in a
vision experiment to
differentiate stripes
from plain gray
(Section 2)
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3. Preferential looking applied to infant-hearing thresholds
3.1 Hoversten and Moncur (1969)
Soon, preferential looking was adapted for infant-hearing studies. The details are crucial, as
follows. Hoversten and Moncur (1969) tested three-month-old and eight-month-old infants
using five stimuli: “white” noise (a hissing sound, having equal energy at all waveform
frequencies within a broad band), 0.5-kHz tones, 4-kHz tones, a woman’s voice, and a short
passage of notes from a children’s song. The tones and the white noise were each presented
as six pulses (all stimuli, therefore, displayed “amplitude modulation,” perhaps to attract the
infant’s attention.) Each stimulus was presented to a loudspeaker on the left or on the right
(chosen at random) of the infant. Two observers were used, one sitting to the right front of
the infant, the other to the left. The observers independently marked charts of 20 possible
changes in the infant’s behavior. In other words, the judges were restricted to pre-ordained
possibilities. Those possibilities included “widening or moving the eyes,” “a decrease or
cessation of activity,” “looking at the observer” and “localization.”
The observer-given grades were only registered when the two observers were in
agreement. The percentage of correct responses, thus judged, rose with the intensity of each
stimulus. The woman’s-voice stimulus produced the highest percentage-correct scores at
any stimulus intensity. For three-month-olds, the overall stimulus-detection threshold,
averaged over all stimuli, was 43 dB HL, where HL (“hearing level”) means “relative to the
detection threshold for young adults” (which was established separately). Thus, three-
month-olds had hearing that was 43 dB less sharp than that of young adults.
The greater effectiveness of the woman’s voice suggests that distraction, rather than
mere detection, determined the infants’ thresholds. This hypothesis is pursued in the
companion paper (Nizami, 2018).
3.2 Thompson and Thompson (1972)
Like Hoversten and Moncur (1969), Thompson and Thompson (1972) made important
contributions to the early methods. Like Hoversten and Moncur (1969), Thompson and
Thompson (1972) used two observers for each infant. But those watchers are now separated:
“One examiner was located in the test room with the child. The other observed the child's
behavior from the control room” (Thompson and Thompson, p. 702). The Thompson and
Thompson (1972) subjects were 7-36 months old. The stimulus, which was 2 s long, could be
a brief speech phrase, a white-noise burst, or one of those same stimuli with components
below 2 kHz filtered-out, or a 3-kHz tone.
During the experiment, “The child was placed on his or her mother's lap in the test room”
(Thompson and Thompson, p. 702). Further, “Soft colorful toys were available to occupy the
child during the test, which took approximately 30 minutes” (p. 702). Further still, “The
mother was instructed not to respond in any way to test stimuli and to be completely quiet
during the test session.” During that session, “Stimuli were presented on a random basis”,
through one loudspeaker or the other. Of course, the latter procedure allows the mothers, too,
to hear the stimuli, perhaps producing subtle changes in “body language” that might
indicate the stimulus to the infant. This potential cue was later avoided in other laboratories,
by obliging the mothers or other infant-handlers to wear headphones that supplied
irrelevant noise or music, masking the presence of the actual stimuli (see below).
Regarding the Thompson and Thompson (1972) “response criteria”, they state that
“Response criteria included localization and awareness to sound. Localization was defined
as a head turn in the direction of the sound source” (p. 702), where the sound source was
either of two loudspeakers. (Head turns were later ruled insufficient for infants younger than
5 months of age; Olsho et al., 1987.) Regarding awareness, “Awareness was defined as either
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a movement of the eyes in the direction of the sound source, or looking up, usually at the
examiner or the mother” (p. 702). The latter criterion seems particularly loose; how does
glancing at any person in the room definitively indicate detection of a test stimulus, unless
that person is actually holding the stimulus source (here, the loudspeaker)? Unfortunately,
such loose criteria have propagated through the literature, as will be shown.
4. Teller and colleagues: forced-choice enters preferential looking
4.1 Differences from Fantz’s methods
Teller et al. (1974) and Teller (1979) were aware of the “preferential looking”method of Fantz
et al. (1962). In fact, they partly adopted the Fantz et al. (1962) methods. Teller (1979)
provides the best explanation of their laboratory’s techniques, as follows. They present a
grating (striped pattern) on one side (left or right) of a center-point. Here, however, they
diverge from Fantz et al. (1962) by having nothing but a luminance-matched gray
background as the other “stimulus object,” rather than having a distinct gray object on a
common, darker background (Fantz et al., 1962). To explain: “The infant is shown a
homogeneous visual display, in which a single visual stimulus is embedded, in a variable
position” (Teller, 1979, p. 143).
Teller and colleagues diverge yet again from Fantz et al. (1962), in that the infant is now
upright and is in contact with a human being, rather than lying horizontally alone in a crib.
That is:
The [infant-] holder holds the infant in front of the display screen [. . .] In most cases the infant is
held in a roughly vertical position, or leaning slightly forward, facing away from the holder
(Teller, 1979, p. 140).
Further:
Between [data-gathering] trials, the holder typically steps backward or rotates away from the
visual display, and directs the infant's attention toward other interesting visual stimuli in the
room (pictures, objects, or people) (Teller, p. 142).
Actual data-gathering proceeds as follows. The person called the “observer”, who is the
adult infant-watcher, is “located behind a peephole at the center of the [stimulus-projection]
screen” (Teller, 1979, p. 136). The observer has help from the infant-holder:
At a signal (“go”) from the experimenter, the holder moves forward and/or rotates slowly toward
the screen, in order to point the infant's head and eyes first toward the peephole, then toward one
of the potential stimulus positions, then toward the other, back toward the central peephole, and
so on until the observer has enough information to be willing to guess the stimulus location
(Teller, p. 142; italics supplied; original internal quotation marks).
In short, at least two intervals of time are required (the turning of the infant), after which the
observer must decide between the two possible locations of the grating (left or right),
making the experimental task altogether a 2- (or more) interval 2-alternative forced-choice
task. Such a task is well-known in psychophysics (Green and Swets, 1966/1988; Macmillan
and Creelman, 1991).
Note again that the infant-holder herself is not the observer; in fact, the infant-holder is
prevented from seeing the actual stimuli, by a baffle or an eye-shield, and thereby prevented
from cueing the infant. Nonetheless, “Frequent small changes are made in the infant's
position. The infant often sucks on a pacifier during testing” (Teller, p. 140). Further:
The holder keeps the infant in almost constant motion back and forth in front of the display, to
optimize the likelihood that the infant’s eyes will catch and fixate the stimulus. Rocking, singing,
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interesting noises, etc., are used by the holder to maintain the infant’s alertness and good humor
(Teller, p. 141).
Given all of these conditions, “A trial can last from perhaps 2 sec (for highly salient stimulus
conditions) to perhaps 1 min (for difficult stimulus conditions)” (Teller, p. 142).
4.2 Watchers forced to make choices
The actual infant-watcher’s role is best expressed by Teller (1979, p. 141):
During each trial the observer is naïve concerning the stimulus conditions and the position of the
stimulus. The observer’s task is to use information supplied by the infant, to infer the position
[left or right] of the stimulus on each trial.
The observer is then told whether their inference is correct or incorrect (i.e. feedback). This
differs from the auditory studies of Hoversten and Moncur (1969) and Thompson and
Thompson (1972). Also, Teller diverges from the vision studies of Fantz et al. (1962). First,
the infant-watcher allegedly never uses corneal reflections to make judgments (Teller et al.,
1974, p. 1434). Rather:
The observer’s criteria for judging the position of the stimulus vary from infant to infant and
from trial to trial. In general, the direction of first fixation, steady fixation on one stimulus
position, and, for a moving infant, compensatory eye and head movements to maintain fixation on
one stimulus position, are the strongest and most reliable cues (Teller, 1979, p. 141).
There are others:
Individual infants give other cues (eye widening, or alternation of fixation followed by steady
fixation of one side, for example), and some give more false cues than others, requiring more
caution on the part of the observer. The trial-by-trial feedback provided by the experimenter
allows observers to adapt readily to these individual differences between infants (Teller, p. 141).
4.3 Construction of psychometric functions
Recall that the experimenters present the infant with a grating (striped pattern) on one side
(left or right) of a center point. Based upon the infant’s behavior, the watcher declares which
side contains the grating. As such, the watcher is either correct or incorrect, and is scored as
such by a laboratory analyst (a student, postdoc, professor or other staffer). The analyst can
then plot percentages-correct versus the width of the stripes in the grating, yielding a set of
data-points. Such plots (Teller, 1979) look like psychometric functions (see above), because
wider stripes generally corresponded to higher percentages-correct. However, no individual
infant provides enough data to build a psychometric function. Hence, the functions are built
by averaging percentage-correct scores over many infants of similar age. This was also done
by Fantz et al. (1962) and Thompson and Thompson (1972) and would be done in later
hearing research (see below). Empirical psychometric functions for infants are remarkably
shallow in slope as compared to what is found for adults, even allowing for the use of
logarithmic x-axis scales by Fantz et al. (1962) and Teller (1979). This finding of shallow
slopes proves crucial to the interpretation of infants’ auditory stimulus-detection thresholds,
and is reserved for the companion paper (Nizami, 2018).
5.Werner and colleagues: forced-choice preferential looking enters auditory studies
5.1 Olsho et al. (1987)) adopt the method of Teller (with notable changes)
Lynne Werner Olsho (later Lynne A. Werner) and colleagues obtained hearing “thresholds”
from children less than six months old, starting with Olsho et al. (1987). The latter paper
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continues to be cited as the pioneering work in infant auditory psychophysics (He et al., 2007;
Smith and Trainor, 2011; Bonino and Leibold, 2017).
Olsho et al. (1987) start from Teller’s (1979) work on two-interval forced-choice looking.
They make two crucial assumptions, in the form of declarations. First:
If the observer [i.e., the watcher] can reliably judge the location of the stimulus in such a
paradigm, then the infant must be providing a reliable behavioral cue to indicate discrimination of
the two stimuli [that are presented on a two-choice task] (Olsho et al., 1987, p. 628).
Here, “discrimination of” means “differentiation between”. Olsho et al. further state (same
page) that:
The response is completely objective: On every trial [i.e. every forced-choice] the observer is either
right or wrong about where the specified stimulus was located [i.e. to the left or the right].
But Olsho et al. (1987) now depart from Teller’s (1979) two-interval scheme. That is, Olsho
et al. (1987) instead use a one-interval scheme, a concept already well-known and well-used
for detection thresholds in adult subjects (Green and Swets, 1966/1988). As Olsho et al. (1987,
p. 628) explain:
The observer watches the infant and must decide whether a specified sound, the signal, was
presented to the infant on that trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the observer is given feedback,
that is, informed whether a signal was actually presented (original italics).
Note well the resemblances to earlier methods, including the use of feedback to the watcher.
5.2 Further differences from earlier studies
The infant’s physical experience resembles that in earlier studies, to some extent:
The infant sits on the parent’s lap while listening to sounds presented monaurally over
lightweight earphones. The infant’s attention is maintained at midline by an assistant [who is]
manipulating toys (Olsho et al., 1987, p. 628).
Furthermore (Olsho et al., p. 629):
At certain times a signal [i.e. an auditory stimulus] is presented. If the infant responds in such a
way that the observer correctly decides that a signal has occurred, a mechanical toy [which is
usually hidden from the infant] is activated to reinforce whatever response was made by the
infant.
Reinforcement (of this kind and others) provides encouragement and therefore has been
used for decades in other kinds of psychology experiments. Olsho et al. (p. 630) continue:
“Obviously, both the parent and the toy waver [the assistant mentioned above] have to be
kept “deaf” to the presentation of sounds to the infant” (original internal quotation marks).
Furthermore, the parent, the infant, and the toy waver (but not necessarily the infant-
watcher) are allwithin a soundproof chamber, greatly reducing environmental noise.
Olsho et al. (p. 629) further explain that “The reinforcer provides feedback [to the infant]
for positive responses [i.e. changes in infant demeanor] detected by the observer.” In other
words, the mechanical toy is activated when the watcher indicates, based on the infant’s
behavior, that the stimulus has occurred when it has, indeed, occurred. Further (Olsho et al.,
p. 629), “No feedback for negative responses [i.e. no recognizable change in infant demeanor]
or undetected positive responses is available to the infant during testing.” Infants only
experience reinforcement when the stimulus is presented and the watcher correctly says so.
In agreement with Teller’s (1979) practice of hiding the observer, and in a further break
from earlier auditory studies such as those of Hoversten and Moncur (1969) and Thompson
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and Thompson (1972), the infant-watchers were situated strictly outside of the testing
chamber:
The observer sits in the adjacent control room, watches the infant through the window [of the
chamber] or on a video monitor (or both), and makes judgments on a trial-by-trial basis (Olsho
et al., 1987, p. 630).
The judgments were based on “eye movements,” “eye widening and other changes in facial
expression,” “head turns”, and “changes in activity level” (Olsho et al., p. 631). However,
Olsho et al. also note that “It is often the case, of course, that the observer cannot define the
response(s) that are the basis for judgments” (p. 631). In other words, a data-gatherer’s
intuition lies behind data appearing in peer-reviewed scientific journals! The watcher in
Trehub et al. (1991), for example, “could use any available cues to support their judgments”
(Trehub et al., 1991, p. 42). Elsewhere, for example in Tharpe and Ashmead (2001, p. 105),
the watcher “was actually free to focus on any aspect of the infant’s behavior.” All of this
echoes Teller’s (1979, p. 138) statement that their watcher used “any available information
supplied by the infant.”
The toy-waver also seems key to the Olsho et al. (1987) experiment, not least for
preventing the infant from losing attention (Olsho et al., p. 630). Regardless, it was the shape
of the plot relating the infant-watcher pair’s score, in percentages-correct, to the intensity of
the stimulus – namely, the psychometric function – that Olsho et al. (p. 634) called “The
major criterion used to determine whether the method was satisfactory for younger infants.”
Olsho et al. (1987, p. 635) declared that those psychometric functions were “reasonable.”
Later, Werner and Gillenwater (1990) would obtain psychometric functions for infants as
young as two-fiveweeks old.
5.3 The Olsho et al. (1987) method is ongoing
The Olsho et al. (1987) method continues to be used for infants six months of age and older
(Werner and Boike, 2001; Leibold and Werner, 2006; Grieco-Calub et al., 2008; Dasika et al.,
2009; Werner et al., 2009; Grieco-Calub and Litovsky, 2012; Hüg et al., 2014; Leibold et al.,
2016), and may still be used for younger infants too. Younger infants are, in fact, being
tested using non-behavioral physiological methods; those methods have their own problems
and are described in the companion paper (Nizami, 2018). Given the ongoing use of the Olsho
et al. (1987) psychophysical method, closer scrutiny of it seems well-justified. As the
particulars derive directly from Teller’s methods (Teller et al., 1974; Teller, 1979), we must
perforce begin with Teller.
6. Problems with Teller’s preferential-looking method
In discussing her research subjects’ psychophysical task, Teller (1979, p. 143) stated that
“The forced-choice preferential looking technique as discussed up to this point provides the
infant with a psychophysical detection task.” But she is wrong. It is the watcher-infant duo
who perform the task, not merely the infant. Teller (1979, p. 138) seems to initially recognize
this:
The observer is a subject in the sense that he or she is faced with a forced-choice task, namely, to
judge the position of the stimulus on each trial, using any available information supplied by the
infant (italics supplied).
Then, remarkably, in the rest of her paper Teller seems to forget that “the observer is a
subject.”
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When the data are later interpreted by a laboratory analyst, it is the entire laboratory that
effectively becomes the observer. Figure 2 shows who constitutes the “observer,” which
changes with successive interpretations from the viewpoint of second-order cybernetics.
The 1-interval 2-alternative (Yes/No) auditory task used subsequently by Olsho et al.
(1987) and her successors maintains this ambiguity, namely, that the detection performance
is that of a watcher-infant duo, not merely the infant.
7. Problems with the preferential-looking method ofWerner and colleagues
7.1 The watcher-infant team: who, exactly, is being conditioned during operant
conditioning?
Olsho et al. (1987) largely adopted their method from Teller (1979). Hence, any problems
with Teller (1979) are likely to carry over to Olsho et al. (1987), and they do, as follows.
Recall from Section 5.2 Olsho et al.’s (1987, p. 629) description of the psychological
reinforcement:
At certain times a signal is presented. If the infant responds in such a way that the observer
correctly decides that a signal has occurred, a mechanical toy is activated to reinforce whatever
response was made by the infant.
Note well that this encouragement of the infant occurs only when the watcher is correct. The
infant is not encouraged on the inevitable occasions when it reacts to the stimulus
presentation but the watcher nonetheless fails to recognize the reaction. Further, the infant is
encouraged if the watcher correctly guesses that the stimulus was presented, even if the
infant did not actually hear it. Altogether, the infant is not being conditioned to respond to
the stimuli; from the infant’s point-of-view, sometimes a mechanical toy is revealed, and
sometimes it is not. In contrast, the watcher is always told whether the stimulus was
presented. But remember that the watcher cannot actually hear the stimulus. Hence, the
watcher is continually being trained to “read” the infant.
There was a later change to theWerner protocol:
At the beginning of each session, the level of the stimulus was fixed at 85 dB SPL and the
mechanical toy was activated at the conclusion of each signal trial regardless of the observer’s
judgment (Werner and Marean, 1991, p. 1868).
Figure 2.
Successive
impressions, from the
viewpoint of second-
order cybernetics, of
who constitutes the
“observer” (here
effectively a listener)
in infant
psychophysics
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That is, a loud auditory stimulus was paired with the activation of the toy. This was
presumably done to link stimulus presence with toy activation, in the infant’s mind, and
later work involved similar conditioning (Werner and Bargones, 1991; Werner et al., 1992;
Werner et al., 1993; Bargones et al., 1995; Werner, 1999; Werner et al., 2001; Leibold and
Werner, 2006; Werner et al., 2009).
Likewise, Schneider et al. (1989), Schneider et al. (1990) and Trehub et al. (1995) used a
training condition. Oddly, Trehub et al. (1991) did not. Their rationale is that such training
sessions render the overall procedure too time-consuming for practical diagnosis of hearing
problems and furthermore that “It remains to be determined whether such training achieves
its goal of enhancing the observer’s performance or bringing it to some asymptotic level”
(Trehub et al., p. 42; italics supplied). This issue is still unresolved.
7.2 The watcher-infant team: how “readable” are infants?
Olsho et al. (1987) seem to recognize a problem with the use of what they call “the observer-
infant team” (p. 638). That is:
If we are investigating pure-tone sensitivity and fail to surpass chance performance [of the
observer-infant team] at low sound pressure levels [SPLs of the stimulus], then it would not be
unreasonable to suggest that the infant’s response to very quiet sounds is so subtle that the
observer is unable to detect it (Olsho et al., p. 638).
If so, then, “The observer’s threshold for detecting an infant response is higher than the
infant’s threshold for detecting a sound, and the infant’s capacity would be underestimated”
(p. 638). But by how much? The answer is crucial to the whole approach of inferring
thresholds from visual observations. As Trehub et al. (1991, p. 45) note, “Infants varied
considerably in their expressiveness or propensity to exhibit overt reactions to sound.”
Hence:
Individual differences in expressiveness are necessarily problematic for any observational
measure of auditory sensitivity, so that underestimates of sensitivity are likely to result from
relatively inscrutable infants with intact hearing (Trehub et al., p. 45).
Trehub et al. (1991) evidently recognize what Olsho et al. (1987) recognize, namely, that
infants’ thresholds are likely to be lower (i.e. better) than experimenters infer. This issue
underlies much of the critique in Nizami (2018).
Further complications abound. Cues from the infant “may not be identical for high- and
low-intensity signals” (Trehub et al., 1991, p. 42). Indeed, as Trehub et al. (p. 42) explain,
“Attenuation of limb movement may be the characteristic response to signals of high or
moderate intensity, whereas subtle eye widening or eyebrow movement may be relevant for
low-intensity signals”.
7.3 The watcher-infant team: disagreements across watchers
It was mentioned earlier that Hoversten and Moncur (1969) and Thompson and Thompson
(1972), unlike the Werner lab or the Schneider/Trehub lab, actually employed two observers
to watch and judge each infant. Hoversten and Moncur (1969) note that their judges agreed
80 per cent of the time when watching three-month-olds and 89 per cent of the time when
watching eight-month-olds. Given this evident difference with infant age, does an infant’s
response to sensory stimuli become easier to read – with greater agreement among
watchers – as infants mature? This issue is returned to, below.
For any given infant age, the lack of total agreement between two judges suggests that
watchers may differ significantly in their observational criteria for what constitutes
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detection of the stimulus by the infant. Moncur (1968, p. 348) thinks this to be non-trivial: “In
single judge evaluations, the excessive exclusion of data is solved [thanks to having no
second judge to disagree with], but the problem of correct judgment is magnified.” Moncur
investigated by exposing infants greater than seven months old to pulsed 0.5-kHz tones, a
female voice, or music. Left and right loudspeakers were at 45 degrees in front of the infant’s
head. The infant was videotaped, and the tapes were shown to panels of judges after-the-
fact. Two judging methods were used. In one method, ratings were assigned to an infant’s
“localization,” “body movements,” “facial movements”, and “cessation or diminution” of
activity, or “status quo” (i.e. no change in behavior). In another method, judges responded
“yes” or “no” as to whether the infant apparently heard the stimulus, along with making a
self-confidence rating of their judgment. The judges were either pediatric audiologists, or
other audiologists, or “laymen.” Moncur (1968) found that the pediatric audiologists had
higher “test-retest agreement” (88 per cent) than laymen (82 per cent) and non-pediatric
audiologists (79 per cent). Both of the judging methods (descriptions, or yes/no) yielded
“approximately the same results” (Moncur, p. 355). In short, judges may indeed agree only
80 per cent of the time, and pediatric audiologists may be better judges than other university
personnel.
Unfortunately, no-one seems to have acted onMoncur’s (1968) conclusions. His finding of
less-than-perfect interjudge agreement is also found in studies of infant vision. For example,
pairs of judges watching infants exposed to Teller-style striped patterns agree as little as 67
per cent of the time (Mash et al., 1995, and papers reviewed therein).
Olsho et al. (1987, p. 631) trained seven observers, but only employed them one-at-a-time.
Indeed, Trehub et al. (1991) used only a single person to make all observations. She was
identified elsewhere as Marilyn Barras, for “assistance in data collection” (Trehub et al.,
1988; Schneider et al., 1990), suggesting that all of the data from the Schneider/Trehub lab
over the course of several years actually represent the observational criteria (and personal
biases) of one individual! Regardless, there is no mention of any of the observers being
pediatric audiologists, or any other audiologists. At least, the watchers were not the
experimenters. However, even this rule could be broken: in Tharpe and Ashmead (2001), for
example, the person initiating the experimental trials was also the watcher.
Arora and Lutfi (2008) offer a model of the watcher’s performance, based upon Signal
Detection Theory. The model is too elaborate to be described here, but Arora and Lutfi
particularly sought:
[. . .] sufficient conditions on the statistical characterization of the judges to attain optimal
detection performance. At the same time we develop expressions for the rate at which the
estimation error decays with number of judges. This will give us the trade-off between the cost
and accuracy of using multiple judges (Arora and Lutfi, p. 1851).
Arora and Lutfi suggest the advantage of using at least five or, better, seven simultaneous
watchers. A hypothetical requirement that several watchers be present, and that all agree
(for example) before the infant is considered to have “responded” to the stimulus, indeed
constitutes a stricter stimulus-detection criterion, and the infant’s inferred threshold would
typically be higher. But as Nizami (2018) explains, higher thresholds may, in fact, be less
credible. In any case, the Arora and Lutfi (2008) calculations do not retroactively make the
infant-testing method itself anymore credible.
7.4 The watcher-infant team: improvement in watcher agreement with infant age
Infants’ stimulus-detection thresholds are inferred from what the infant attends to.
Therefore, if there is any change over time in the watcher’s ability to “read” the infant, it
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confounds with any change over time in the infant itself, such as an increase or decrease of
the actual detection-thresholds. Now, the watcher’s judgments are based at least partially
upon reading the infant’s face. Does that particular “watcher skill” change as the infant gets
older? The answer seems crucial, and yet the present author found only a single study
devoted to answering it. That particular study’s authors were not even concerned with
stimulus-detection thresholds per se.
Briefly, Galati and Lavelli (1997) videotaped three boys and three girls at three days, one
month, and three months of age (always the same infants). Each time, the infants
experienced the same five naturalistic situations that are traditionally believed to elicit
different emotions. These situations were:
 immediately before feeding;
 forced movement (hip rotation during the medical examination [in the birth
hospital]);
 in his/her mother’s arms immediately after feeding;
 detaching from his/her mother (when the baby was put in the cot after feeding); and
 inoculation (for a blood test or vaccination) (Galati and Lavelli, p. 61).
The infants’ faces were isolated post hoc in the videotapes. Furthermore, only those video
segments were used which were approved as “truly connected to the eliciting situation”
(p. 62) by a panel of five researchers “who were experts in coding the facial expressions of
babies” (p. 62). Subsequently, non-expert groups of 30 undergraduate “decoders,” one group
for each of the three infant ages, viewed each videotape. The undergraduate decoders rated
each infant’s expressions according to its level of excitement and its level of displeasure,
using separate smooth rating-scales.
Galati and Lavelli (1997) assumed that “the more the decoders’ interpretation of a signal
[i.e. an infant’s expression] agree, the more the meaning of that stimulus [i.e. that expression]
is clear and unambiguous” (p. 65). The decoders’ agreement for the smooth scales increased
with the infant’s ages. In other words, infants’ faces become easier to read from birth to three
months old –which is the range of greatest interest for infant psychophysics.
7.5 The watcher-infant team: look duration in forced-choice preferential looking
Readers might object that inferring an infant’s feelings in response to a sensory stimulus is
not the same thing as inferring whether the infant attended to the stimulus or not. But
inferring what the infant attends to can involve other confounds, as follows. Hansen and
Fulton (1981) use Teller’s (1979) forced-choice preferential-looking method to test a different
infant at each of 2, 4, 8, 12 and 18 weeks of age. A blue dot was shown on a red background
in darkness, on either the left or right side, and a watcher (aided by infra-red viewing
equipment) judged whether the infant looked toward the left or the right. “Sensitivity” to the
blue dot, thus obtained, increased with age; the infant who was 18 weeks old even achieved
the known adult degree of sensitivity. This might be hastily interpreted as proof that
detection thresholds drop with increasing infant age. However, Colombo (2002) reviewed the
literature on visual behavior by infants, and found that look duration to visual stimuli rises
over the period from birth to 7 weeks, and then falls again, stabilizing by roughly 20 weeks.
If the Hansen and Fulton (1981) watchers – and those in auditory studies too – are judging
attentiveness by gaze, how then can they be confident in their judgments, given Colombo’s
(2002) findings?
Too resilient
for anyone’s
good
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 D
oc
to
r I
fti
kh
ar
 N
iz
am
i A
t 1
0:
49
 0
8 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
8. Summary and conclusions on infant “detection thresholds”
Infants are difficult subjects for psychophysical stimulus-detection or stimulus-
discrimination tasks, in which a decision must be made about a stimulus, such as “it was
barely visible” or “it was louder than another sound.” Adults can indicate such decisions
unambiguously; infants cannot, and hence in-laboratory watchers must infer, from infants’
behavior, whether the infants saw or heard a particular stimulus.
This modern “infant psychophysics” started with studies of the visual system. Fantz and
colleagues inferred the visual acuity of infants by recording how long and how often an
infant fixated each of two alternatives, a striped pattern (grating) and a plain gray
comparison. Soon, this “preferential looking” method was adapted for hearing studies. The
stimuli could, for example, be “white” (i.e. broadband) noise or single-frequency tones or
voices or musical notes. Each stimulus was presented to a left-side or right-side loudspeaker.
Watchers inferred which loudspeaker the infant attended to. Indeed, the watchers even
inferred whether the infant heard the stimulus at all, based on “widening or moving the
eyes,” “a decrease or cessation of activity”, and “looking at the observer”, among other cues.
Further changes were made, for testing visual acuity, by Teller and her colleagues. They
presented a grating on one side or the other of a center point. Teller’s watchers declared
which of two directions the infant looked, a procedure called two-alternative forced-choice.
Unlike earlier studies, the watcher was told whether their inference was correct or incorrect.
Percentages-correct could then be plotted versus the width of the stripes in the grating,
yielding a set of points, the psychometric function. These resembled psychometric functions
found earlier by Fantz and colleagues, insofar as they had remarkably shallow slopes as
compared to those of adults.
Yet further changes were made by Lynne Werner Olsho (later L.A. Werner) and
colleagues, in the course of extending Teller’s technique to auditory stimulus detection in
infants. Instead of Teller’s two- (or more) interval scheme, Werner and colleagues use a one-
interval scheme in which the stimulus is either presented or not, which is inferred by the
watcher from the infant’s behavior. The watcher is told whether or not they are correct. The
watcher’s judgments are based on “eye movements,” “eye widening and other changes in
facial expression,” “changes in activity level”, etc., although sometimes the watchers simply
rely upon their intuition. When the stimulus is presented and the watcher correctly indicates
so, then a mechanical toy is revealed to the infant to psychologically reinforce the infant’s
response. When possible, psychometric functions for infants’ detection of the stimuli are
built. Those functions prove to be relatively shallow in slope.
The method of Werner and colleagues is still the standard for psychophysical testing of
infants. But when it is scrutinized from a second-order-cybernetics viewpoint, incongruities
arise. First, it is the watcher-infant duo who perform the detection/discrimination task, not
merely the infant. The next crucial step, data analysis, is done by the rest of the laboratory.
It is the whole laboratory, therefore, using the infant as a blunt probe, which produces
psychophysical thresholds. Further, Werner and colleagues inform the watcher of the
correct answer, which trains the watcher to “read” the infant. But from the infant’s point-of-
view, sometimes a reward appears (a mechanical toy activates), and sometimes it does not.
Why?
There are yet further complications. Cues from the infant may differ by stimulus
intensity, hence the infant’s response to stimuli that it finds “quiet” may be
indistinguishable from no response at all. Also, expressiveness may differ across infants.
What one watcher takes to be moment-by-moment evidence of stimulus-detection by the
infant might differ from what another watcher believes. In fact, some pre-Werner studies of
infant hearing employed twowatchers for each infant, unlike theWerner lab (and Teller and
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Fantz in vision). Some studies even examined the mutual agreement of watchers. However,
including more watchers does not increase the credibility of the basic method; whereas
having a single watcher incorporates that watcher’s prejudices.
Infants’ stimulus-detection thresholds are empirically sought not only for their current
presumed usefulness but also to examine their change over time. However, stimulus-
detection thresholds reflect the watcher’s ability to infer what the infant is attending to;
therefore, if infants’ responses become easier for the watcher to read with infant maturation,
then any interpretation of change in the infant’s abilities is confounded. Further, the infant’s
gaze is used as a cue to whether the infant detects the stimulus, but gaze duration may be a
nonlinear function of infant age.
Workers in infant psychophysics have neglected an important second-order cybernetics
emphasis, namely, the role of the observer. Consequently, suspicious methods have
propagated, with a commensurate accumulation of questionable data. All of this occurs at
the taxpayers’ expense. Altogether, infant psychophysics has proven to be too resilient for
anybody’s good.
References
Arora, R. and Lutfi, R.A. (2008), “Detection-theoretic analysis of the observer-based psychophysical
procedure”, Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 123 No. 4, pp. 1850-1853.
Bargones, J.Y., Werner, L.A. and Marean, G.C. (1995), “Infant psychometric functions for detection:
mechanisms of immature sensitivity”, Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 98 No. 1,
pp. 99-111.
Bonino, A.Y. and Leibold, L.J. (2017), “Behavioral assessment of hearing in 2 to 4 year-old children: a
two-interval, observer-based procedure using conditioned play-based responses”, Journal of
Visualized Experiments, Vol. 119, pp. 1-7, available at: http://dx. doi.org/10.3791/54788
Colombo, J. (2002), “Infant attention grows up: the emergence of a developmental cognitive
neuroscience perspective”, Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 11 No. 6, pp. 196-200.
Dasika, V.K., Werner, L.A., Norton, S.J., Nie, K. and Rubinstein, J.T. (2009), “Measuring sound detection
and reaction time in infant and toddler cochlear implant recipients using an observer-based
procedure: a first report”, Ear and Hearing, Vol. 30 No. 2, pp. 250-261.
Elmqvist, T., Andersson, E., Gaffney, O. and McPhearson, T. (2017), “Sustainability and resilience
differ”,Nature, Vol. 546 No. 7658, p. 352.
Fantz, R.L. (1963), “Pattern vision in newborn infants”, Science (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 140 No. 3564,
pp. 296-297.
Fantz, R.L. (1965), “Visual perception from birth as shown by pattern selectivity”, Annals of the New
York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 118 No. 21, pp. 793-814.
Fantz, R.L., Ordy, J.M. and Udelf, M.S. (1962), “Maturation of pattern vision in infants during the first
six months”, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, Vol. 55 No. 6, pp. 907-917.
Galati, D. and Lavelli, M. (1997), “Neonate and infant emotion expression perceived by adults”, Journal
of Nonverbal Behavior, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 57-83.
Green, D.M. and Swets, J.A. (1966/1988), Signal Detection Theory and Psychophysics, Peninsula
Publishing, Los Altos, CA.
Grieco-Calub, T.M. and Litovsky, R.Y. (2012), “Spatial acuity in two-to-three-year-old children with
normal acoustic hearing, unilateral cochlear implants and bilateral cochlear implants”, Ear and
Hearing, Vol. 33 No. 5, pp. 561-572.
Grieco-Calub, T.M., Litovsky, R.Y. and Werner, L.A. (2008), “Using the observer-based psychophysical
procedure to assess localization acuity in toddlers who use bilateral cochlear implants”, Otology
and Neurotology, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 235-239.
Too resilient
for anyone’s
good
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 D
oc
to
r I
fti
kh
ar
 N
iz
am
i A
t 1
0:
49
 0
8 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
Hamer, R.D., Alexander, K.R. and Teller, D.Y. (1982), “Rayleigh discriminations in young human
infants”,Vision Research, Vol. 22 No. 5, pp. 575-587.
Hansen, R.M. and Fulton, A.B. (1981), “Behavioral measurement of background adaptation in infants”,
Investigative Ophthalmology and Visual Science, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 625-629.
Hartmann,W.M. (1998), Signals, Sound, and Sensation, Springer-Verlag, New York, NY.
He, C., Hotson, L. and Trainor, L.J. (2007), “Mismatch responses to pitch changes in early infancy”,
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, Vol. 19 No. 5, pp. 878-892.
Hoversten, G.H. and Moncur, J.P. (1969), “Stimuli and intensity factors in testing infants”, Journal of
Speech and Hearing Research, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 687-702.
Hüg, M.X., Arias, C., Tommasini, F.C. and Ramos, O.A. (2014), “Auditory localization and precedence
effect: an exploratory study in infants and toddlers with visual impairment and normal vision”,
Research in Developmental Disabilities, Vol. 35 No. 9, pp. 2015-2025.
Johnson, H.A. (1970), “Information theory in biology after 18 years”, Science (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 168
No. 3939, pp. 1545-1550.
Lau, B.K. and Ng,M. (2017), “Infants note the notes”, Physics Today, Vol. 70 No. 7, pp. 78-79.
Leibold, L.J., Bonino, A.Y. and Buss, E. (2016), “Masked speech perception thresholds in infants,
children, and adults”, Ear and Hearing, Vol. 37 No. 3, pp. 345-353.
Leibold, L.J. and Werner, L.A. (2006), “Effect of masker-frequency variability on the detection
performance of infants and adults”, Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 119 No. 6,
pp. 3960-3970.
Macmillan, N.A. and Creelman, C.D. (1991),Detection Theory: A User’s Guide, Cambridge U. Press, New
York, NY.
Mash, C., Dobson, V. and Carpenter, N. (1995), “Interobserver agreement for measurement of grating
acuity and interocular acuity differences with the Teller acuity card procedure”,Vision Research,
Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 303-312.
Moncur, J.P. (1968), “Judge reliability in infant testing”, Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, Vol. 11
No. 2, pp. 348-357.
Nizami, L. (2010), “Interpretation of absolute judgments using Information Theory: channel capacity or
memory capacity?”, Cybernetics and HumanKnowing, Vol. 17 Nos 1/2, pp. 111-155.
Nizami, L. (2011a), “Memory model of information transmitted in absolute judgment”, Kybernetes,
Vol. 40 Nos 1/2, pp. 80-109.
Nizami, L. (2011b), “Norwich’s Entropy Theory: how not to go from abstract to actual”, Kybernetes,
Vol. 40 Nos 7/8, pp. 1102-1118.
Nizami, L. (2012), “Confusing the ‘confusionmatrix’: the misapplication of Shannon Information Theory
in sensory psychology”, Acta Systemica (International Journal of the International Institute for
Advanced Studies in Systems Research and Cybernetics), Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 1-17.
Nizami, L. (2013), “Paradigm versus praxis: why psychology ‘absolute identification’ experiments do
not reveal sensory processes”,Kybernetes, Vol. 42 Nos 9/10, pp. 1447-1456.
Nizami, L. (2015), “Homunculus strides again: why ‘information transmitted’ in neuroscience tells us
nothing”,Kybernetes, Vol. 44 Nos 8/9, pp. 1358-1370.
Nizami, L. (2016), “What ability is measured in infant psychophysics?”, Abstract 4aPPa22, Journal of
the Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 140 No. 4, (Pt. 2), p. 3266.
Nizami, L. (2018), “Too resilient for anyone’s good: ‘infant psychophysics’ viewed through second-order
cybernetics, part 2 (re-interpretation)”, accepted atKybernetes.
Nizami, L. (2014), “Information Theory’s failure in neuroscience: on the limitations of cybernetics”,
Paper No. 158, Proceedings of the IEEE 2014 Conference on Norbert Wiener in the 21st Century,
IEEE, Piscataway, NJ.
K
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 D
oc
to
r I
fti
kh
ar
 N
iz
am
i A
t 1
0:
49
 0
8 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
Olsho, L.W., Koch, E.G., Halpin, C.F. and Carter, E.A. (1987), “An observer-based psychoacoustic
procedure for use with young infants”,Developmental Psychology, Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 627-640.
Schneck, M.E., Hamer, R.D., Packer, O.S. and Teller, D.Y. (1984), “Area-threshold relations at controlled
retinal locations in 1-month-old infants”,Vision Research, Vol. 24 No. 12, pp. 1753-1763.
Schneider, B.A., Morrongiello, B.A. and Trehub, S.E. (1990), “Size of critical band in infants, children,
and adults”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, Vol. 16
No. 3, pp. 642-652.
Schneider, B.A., Trehub, S.E., Morrongiello, B.A. and Thorpe, L.A. (1989), “Developmental changes in
masked thresholds”, Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 86 No. 5, pp. 1733-1742.
Shannon, C.E. (1956), “The bandwagon”, IRETransactions on Information Theory, Vol. 2 No. 1, p. 3.
Smith, N.A. and Trainor, L.J. (2011), “Auditory stream segregation improves infants’ selective attention
to target tones amid distractors”, Infancy, Vol. 16 No. 6, pp. 655-668.
Susswein, N. (2013), “Facing facts about ‘information’ in psychology”, Doctoral Dissertation, Dept. of
Psychology, Simon Fraser University, BC.
Svirsky, M. (2017), “Cochlear implants and electronic hearing”, Physics Today, Vol. 70 No. 8, pp. 52-58.
Teller, D.Y. (1979), “The forced-choice preferential looking procedure: a psychophysical technique for
use with human infants”, Infant Behavior and Development, Vol. 2, pp. 135-153.
Teller, D.Y., Morse, R., Borton, R. and Regal, D. (1974), “Visual acuity for vertical and diagonal gratings
in human infants”,Vision Research, Vol. 14 No. 12, pp. 1433-1439.
Tharpe, A.M. and Ashmead, D.H. (2001), “A longitudinal investigation of infant auditory sensitivity”,
American Journal of Audiology, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 104-112.
Thompson, M. and Thompson, G. (1972), “Response of infants and young children as a function of
auditory stimuli and test methods”, Journal of Speech Language and Hearing Research, Vol. 15
No. 4, pp. 699-707.
Trehub, S.E., Schneider, B.A. and Henderson, J.L. (1995), “Gap detection in infants, children, and
adults”, Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 98 No. 5, pp. 2532-2541.
Trehub, S.E., Schneider, B.A., Morrongiello, B.A. and Thorpe, L.A. (1988), “Auditory sensitivity in
school-age children”, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, Vol. 46 No. 2, pp. 273-285.
Trehub, S.E., Schneider, B.A., Thorpe, L.A. and Judge, P. (1991), “Observational measures of auditory
sensitivity in early infancy”,Developmental Psychology, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 40-49.
Werner, L.A. (1999), “Forward masking among infant and adult listeners”, Journal of the Acoustical
Society of America, Vol. 105 No. 4, pp. 2445-2453.
Werner, L.A. (2012), “Overview and issues in human auditory development”, in Werner, L.A., Fay, R.R.
and Popper, A.N. (Eds), Human Auditory Development, Springer ScienceþBusiness Media, New
York, NY, pp. 1-18.
Werner, L.A. and Bargones, J.Y. (1991), “Sources of auditory masking in infants: distraction effects”,
Perception and Psychophysics, Vol. 50 No. 5, pp. 405-412.
Werner, L.A. and Boike, K. (2001), “Infants’ sensitivity to broadband noise”, Journal of the Acoustical
Society of America, Vol. 109 No. 5, pp. 2103-2111.
Werner, L.A., Folsom, R.C. and Mancl, L.R. (1993), “The relationship between auditory brainstem
response and behavioral thresholds in normal hearing infants and adults”, Hearing Research,
Vol. 68 No. 1, pp. 131-141.
Werner, L.A., Folsom, R.C., Mancl, L.R. and Syapin, C.L. (2001), “Human auditory brainstem response
to temporal gaps in noise”, Journal of Speech Language and Hearing Research, Vol. 44 No. 4,
pp. 737-750.
Werner, L.A. and Gillenwater, J.M. (1990), “Pure-tone sensitivity of 2- to 5-week-old infants”, Infant
Behavior and Development, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 355-375.
Too resilient
for anyone’s
good
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 D
oc
to
r I
fti
kh
ar
 N
iz
am
i A
t 1
0:
49
 0
8 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
Werner, L.A. and Marean, G.C. (1991), “Methods for estimating infant thresholds”, Journal of the
Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 90 No. 4, pp. 1867-1875.
Werner, L.A., Marean, G.C., Halpin, C.F., Spetner, N.B. and Gillenwater, J.M. (1992), “Infant auditory
temporal acuity: gap detection”, Child Development, Vol. 63 No. 2, pp. 260-272.
Werner, L.A., Parrish, H.K. and Holmer, N.M. (2009), “Effects of temporal uncertainty and temporal
expectancy on infants’ auditory sensitivity”, Journal of the Acoustical Society of America,
Vol. 125 No. 2, pp. 1040-1049.
Wiener, N. (1956), “What is information theory?”, IRE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 2
No. 2, p. 48.
Further reading
Hamer, R.D. (2016), “The visual world of infants”,American Scientist, Vol. 104 No. 2, pp. 96-101.
Corresponding author
Lance Nizami can be contacted at: nizamii2@att.net
For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
K
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 D
oc
to
r I
fti
kh
ar
 N
iz
am
i A
t 1
0:
49
 0
8 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
